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ARTICLES
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A LIBERAL
RESPONSE
GREGORY BASSHAM*
Over the last two decades, mainstream liberal jurispru-
dence has confronted four major insurgencies: New Right con-
stitutionalism,' critical legal studies,2 the economic analysis of
law,' and feminist legal theory.4 The first three of these move-
ments have provoked vigorous and sustained liberal counterat-
tacks.5 But liberals thus far have been slow to respond to what
is rapidly emerging as the most powerful contemporary chal-
lenge to liberal jurisprudence: feminist legal theory.6 In this
article, I offer a liberal critique of selected anti-liberal themes in
recent feminist legal thought.
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre
Dame.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
2. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987);
ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d
ed. 1986).
4. For useful introductions, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND
GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1989); Katherine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826 (1988) (book review).
5. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
(1987) (critiquing New Right constitutionalism); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK (1990)
(same); ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE
(1990) (critiquing critical legal studies); Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987)
(same); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 237-89 (1985) (critiquing
the economic analysis of law).
6. For an outstanding exception, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 238-92 (1990).
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Feminist legal theory, like feminist theory generally, "is
extremely diverse, in both premisses and conclusion." 7 What
feminist legal theorists have in common is a commitment to
three basic claims: (1) that gender is a central category of anal-
ysis in law;8 (2) that important aspects of mainstream legal doc-
trine and theory were "developed with men's experience and
interests in mind [and] are incapable of adequately recognizing
women's needs or incorporating women's experiences;"' and
(3) that significant changes are needed in the law in order to
promote greater equality between the sexes.
A good deal of recent feminist legal scholarship is consis-
tent with liberal legal and political theory, broadly understood.
Feminists who argue, for example, that many purportedly
"neutral" legal practices and rules are actually male-biased' 0
are not eo ipso rejecting legal liberalism. For a central premise
of modern liberal theory is that the state must treat each of its
citizens with equal consideration and respect." Liberalism
itself thus requires legal officials to be alert to any hidden gen-
der implications of ostensibly neutral legal standards and con-
cepts. My interest here, however, is not in the large and
impressive body of recent feminist scholarship that demon-
strates how badly mainstream liberal jurisprudence has often
failed to live up to its own guiding principles. Instead, I shall
focus on three prominent themes in feminist legal theory that
directly challenge fundamental premises of liberal jurispru-
dence: (a) that the current gender-neutral "difference"
approach to sex discrimination issues should be replaced by a
gender-sensitive "dominance" approach; (b) that women rea-
son in a "different voice" morally, a voice that has wrongly
been ignored or slighted in liberal legal doctrine and scholar-
7. Id. at 238.
8. Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617,
619 (1990).
9. KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 238.
10. See, eg., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 92-104 (1987) (criticizing the
way current rape law focuses on what the defendant "reasonably" believed
the woman wanted, rather than on the intentions the woman "reasonably"
believed she conveyed to the defendant); Christine A. Littleton, Women's
Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (arguing that current legal views of battered women
fail to reflect women's own experience of being in battering relationships);
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (arguing that work-family conflicts
should not be viewed as private matters to be resolved by individuals but as
public matters requiring restructuring of the workplace).
11. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1978);
KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 4.
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ship; and (c) that pornography should not be viewed as pro-
tected speech, but as a legally actionable form of sex
discrimination against women. I shall argue that none of these
criticisms of liberal jurisprudence succeeds.
I. GENDER EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
For much of our nation's history, women were denied
basic rights of equal citizenship and were openly discriminated
against in education, employment, and other areas of public
and private life." Not until 1964, with the passage of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, did it become unlawful for most
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex. Not until 1971
did the Supreme Court rule that invidious sex-based classifica-
tions by the state presumptively violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.'
3
Current sex discrimination law has two major strands:
equal protection analysis and Title VII equal employment
opportunity law. The first prohibits most forms of deliberate
gender discrimination by the state: it permits sex-based classi-
fications only if they are "substantially related" to "important"
governmental objectives.' 4 The second prohibits both direct
and indirect sex discrimination in employment. Employment
practices involving intentional sex discrimination (so-called
"disparate treatment") are permissible only if it can be proven
that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for the posi-
tion. 5 Employment practices which, while facially neutral,
have an adverse "disparate impact" on either men or women
are lawful only if it can be shown that the practices constitute a
"business necessity."16
Both major strands of current sex discrimination law
reflect what Catharine MacKinnon calls a "difference"
approach to gender discrimination.' 7 That approach asks
12. See generally RHODE, supra note 4, at 9-50.
13. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
14. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 n.7 (1976).
15. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
16. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
17. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAw 32-45 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED];
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34
(1989) [hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY].
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whether there are any genuine differences between men and
women that might serve to justify differential treatment of the
sexes. It views gender discrimination, not as a matter of sub-
stantive inequality or disadvantage between the sexes, but as a
failure to respect the requirement of "formal equality" that
similarly situated persons be treated similarly. Thus, where
men and women are, for whatever reason, not "similarly situ-
ated" with respect to important business or regulatory inter-
ests, it may be unfair but it will not be actionably discriminatory
to treat them differently.
This difference approach to sex discrimination law has
been heavily criticized by feminist legal theorists. Four major
criticisms have been advanced: (1) that the basic principle of
the difference approach-the requirement that like cases be
treated alike-"verges on tautology;"'" (2) that as a practical
matter, the difference approach "has both over- and underval-
ued gender differences;"' 9 (3) that the difference approach is
blind to gender discrimination that occurs in contexts in which
cross-gender comparisons cannot be made;2 ° and (4) that the
difference approach "affords no basis for challenging rules
which structure the work place to fit men's life experiences and
needs, but not women's."'2 ' I shall consider each of these criti-
cisms in turn.
The charge that the difference approach verges on tautol-
ogy rests on a confusion between tautologousness and abstract-
ness. A tautology (e.g. "All men are men" or "It's raining or
it's not raining") is a logical truth, i.e. a statement that is true
simply in virtue of its logical form. 2 The statement "equals
should be treated equally" is tautologous only if the predicate
"should be treated equally" is built into the notion of those
who count as "equals." But this is not how the statement is
normally used in moral and political discourse. Normally, the
statement is used to express an abstract, but not logically true,
principle of political morality, namely, that individuals who are
alike in every relevant respect (not in absolutely every respect)
18. RHODE, supra note 4, at 81.
19. Id. at 3.
20. See, e.g., FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 17, at 223; Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1305-06 (1987);
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response
to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 281-82 (1984).
21. Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT.
REV. 201, 234.
22. See TJ. RICHARDS, THE LANGUAGE OF REASON 156-57 (1978).
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ought to be treated alike.2" Thus construed, the principle of
formal equality is informative, but only minimally so. To be
useful, the principle must be supplemented by principles of
substantive equality, that is, principles that specify criteria for
determining the relevance of differences. 24 And this, of course,
is exactly what the legal architects of contemporary sex discrim-
ination law have done in developing a body of rules and stan-
dards for determining when impermissible sex-based
discrimination occurs.
A second common criticism of the difference approach is
that courts, in applying it, have regularly tended both to over-
and undervalue gender differences. As Deborah Rhode
expresses the point:
In some instances, biology has determined destiny, while
in other contexts, women's particular needs have gone
unacknowledged and unaddressed. Too often courts
have treated gender as a matter of immutable difference
rather than as a cultural construct open to legal challenge
and social change. Reliance on "real difference" has
deflected attention from the process by which differences
have been attributed and from the groups that are under-
represented in that process. Such an approach has often
done more to reflect sex-based inequalities than to chal-
lenge them.
2 5
To consider this charge as carefully as it deserves would
require a lengthy review of modern sex discrimination case-
law. Such a review cannot be undertaken here. But three
points are worth noting. First, given the fact that women's
groups have themselves been sharply divided over the nature
and significance of gender differences, 26 it is hardly surprising
that courts should sometimes make mistakes in applying such
broad standards as "business necessity" or "important govern-
mental objective." Second, it is striking that virtually all of the
cases commonly cited as examples ofjudicial over- or underval-
uation of gender differences date from the relatively early years
of the current women's movement.27 There is little evidence
that courts have regularly been swayed by overt sexist stereo-
types over the course of the last decade or so. Finally, as I shall
23. See JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 99-100 (1973).
24. See generally MICHAEL QUINN, JUSTICE AND EGALITARIANISM: FORMAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN SOME RECENT THEORIES OF JUSTICE (1991).
25. RHODE, supra note 4, at 3.
26. See Bartlett, supra note 4, at 842 n.48; Rhode, supra note 8, at 623
n.22.
27. See generally RHODE, supra note 4, at 86-125.
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argue below, it is doubtful whether the leading feminist alter-
natives to the difference approach succeed in avoiding the very
problems at issue here.
A third common objection to the difference approach is
that it is often blind to instances of sex-based discrimination in
cases in which cross-gender comparisons are difficult or impos-
sible. A case frequently cited in this connection is Geduldig v.
Aiello.28 At issue there was a California disability insurance pro-
gram for state employees that singled out pregnancy as virtu-
ally the only long-term disability excluded from coverage.
Notoriously, the Court ruled that the program did not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, but instead rested on a gender-neutral
distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant persons.29
Feminists have rightly condemned this absurdly artificial
analysis. As Stephanie Wildman notes,
Without a pregnant man with whom to compare the
treatment of pregnant women, the Court was unable to
see, or refused to see, that disadvantageous disparate
treatment of women on account of pregnancy could seri-
ously affect their participation in the paid labor force, as
well as in other social spheres.
30
The lesson Wildman draws from Geduldig is that the difference
approach is poorly equipped to detect gender-based discrimi-
nation whenever "real differences" exist between men and
women.
This, however, is a mistake. The difference approach asks
exactly the right questions about the disability plan at issue in
Geduldig: Was the plan's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabil-
ities a gender-based classification? (Yes.) If so, were there any
governmental interests sufficiently important to justify the dis-
parate treatment? (No.) Nevertheless, Wildman does point to
an important problem which difference theorists too often
overlook: the difficulty of determining whether men and
women truly are "similarly situated" for purposes of discrimi-
nation analysis.
Consider the following argument:
(1) A person is discriminated against only if she is
treated less favorably than someone who is similarly situ-
ated to her.
28. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
29. See id. at 496-97 n.20.
30. Wildman, supra note 20, at 281-82.
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(2) Under California's disability plan, no one was
treated less favorably than others who were similarly situ-
ated to them; in particular, no pregnant women were
treated less favorably than similarly situated men.
Therefore
(3) No one was discriminated against under Califor-
nia's disability plan.
This is a valid argument the conclusion of which, we have
seen, is false. It follows that one or both of the premises must
be false. Feminist critics of the difference approach have
argued that we should reject (1). But (1), properly understood,
is a necessary truth. It simply cashes out part of what we mean
by "discriminatory treatment." It follows, therefore, that (2)
must be false. But it is not altogether easy to see why (2) is
false. It is tempting to say that men and women are not simi-
larly situated in the one respect that matters in this case: their
respective capacities to become pregnant. But this would be to
misunderstand what difference theorists mean when they speak
of "similarly situated" individuals. As we have seen, when dif-
ference theorists assert that similarly situated individuals ought
to be treated similarly, they are asserting an abstract principle
of justice, namely, that individuals who are identical in every
morally relevant respect ought to be treated the same. In this
case, there were no morally relevant differences between Cali-
fornia's male and female state employees. Both shared an
equally compelling interest in being able to engage in repro-
ductive activity without risk of losing their jobs or incurring
crippling expenses. 3 ' The fact that California taxpayers or
state employees could save money by discriminating against
reproductively active women was not a sufficient justification
for such invidious disparate treatment.
This brings us to the fourth and most important feminist
argument against the difference approach: that it reinforces
longstanding patterns of gender discrimination by taking male-
defined norms as the standard against which to weigh women's
claims to equal treatment. As Catharine MacKinnon notes,
[V]irtually every quality that distinguishes men from
women is already affirmatively compensated in this soci-
ety. Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs
define auto and health insurance coverage, their socially-
designed biographies define workplace expectations and
successful career patterns, their perspectives and con-
31. Cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1584 (2d
ed. 1988).
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cerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and
obsessions define merit, their objectification of life
defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their
presence defines family, their inability to get along with
each other-their wars and rulerships-defines history,
their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.
For each of their differences from women, what amounts
to an affirmative action plan is in effect, otherwise known
as the structure and values of American society."2
None of this counts as a form of discrimination under the cur-
rent difference approach to gender discrimination." That
approach asks only whether men and women are similarly situ-
ated with respect to important business or regulatory interests.
It does not ask whether women have been unfairly disadvan-
taged in the quest for social goods by past discrimination or by
male-biased standards of merit or desert. In this way, the dif-
ference approach may indeed serve to reinforce rather than to
challenge persistent patterns of gender discrimination and
disadvantage.
Consider how the difference approach applies in the area
of employment discrimination. Many high-paying or otherwise
desirablejobs require their holders to travel, work long, inflexi-
ble hours, or both. These jobs presuppose, in other words,
"that the person, gender neutral, who is qualified for them will
be someone who is not the primary caretaker of a preschool
child." 4 Since women are still overwhelmingly expected to be
the primary caretakers of young children in our society, they
will tend to do worse than men in competing for such jobs.
However, so long as these facially gender-neutral job qualifica-
tions are a legitimate "business necessity," any adverse dispa-
rate impact they may have on women will be permissible under
current sex discrimination law.
As this example makes clear, the difference approach is
incapable of bringing about real equality between the sexes.
What is needed, according to MacKinnon, is a theory of sex
discrimination that focuses not on questions of gender differ-
ence, but on the socially pervasive reality of gender domina-
tion. The alternative test of actionable sex discrimination she
proposes is simple: "[D]oes a practice participate in the subor-
32. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 36.
33. Cf KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 241 (on which I rely in this and the
following paragraph).
34. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 37.
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dination of women to men, or is it no part of it?" 5 On this
broadened conception of sex discrimination, "[s]exual harass-
ment, battering, legally recognized rape, and other forms of
coercive sex, job segregation, the low economic value assigned
to women's work, the lack of reproductive freedom for women
(including the lack of financially available abortion), the confla-
tion of sex with violence and with subjugating objectification in
pornography"-in short, "all practices and social relations that
contribute to the subordination of women, or that result from
women's subordinate status, are and should be legally actiona-
ble forms of sex discrimination."36
MacKinnon clearly believes that this dominance approach
to sex discrimination is inconsistent with the basic principles of
liberal jurisprudence.3 7 But this is a mistake according to Will
Kymlicka, a leading contemporary defender of liberalism. In
Kymlicka's view, liberalism's core commitment to treating indi-
viduals with equal concern and respect is fully consistent with,
and in fact requires, something like MacKinnon's dominance
approach to isgues of gender inequality and discrimination.3 8 I
shall argue that Kymlicka is wrong about this: MacKinnon's
dominance approach really is fundamentally inconsistent with
core liberal principles that rightly enjoy broad public support.
We should begin by asking whether MacKinnon's domi-
nance approach is, in fact, consistent with treating individuals
with equal concern and respect. Political theorists differ widely
over what concrete implications follow from the abstract
requirement that governments treat individuals as worthy of
equal concern and respect.3 9 But few would dispute that an
anti-discrimination principle that fails to protect members of
one sex against overt and wholly arbitrary discrimination fails
to treat such persons as equals. A major worry about MacKin-
non's dominance approach is that it would leave men largely
unprotected against just such discrimination.
As MacKinnon notes, many of the leading sex discrimina-
tion cases decided over the last two decades were brought (and
won) by male plaintiffs.40 Modern sex discrimination doctrine,
although it permits affirmative action programs that are sub-
35. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 17, at 248.
36. Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women:
Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 352, 356 (1988) (book
review).
37. See generally FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 215-28.
38. See KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 246-47.
39. See id. at 4; DWORIN, supra note 11, at 179-83.
40. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 35.
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stantially related to important governmental objectives, 4' pro-
hibits arbitrary discrimination against either sex. MacKinnon's
dominance approach, by contrast, explicitly accords special
treatment to women. Gender-based discrimination against
men would be unlawful on her proposed test only if it "partici-
pate[s] in the subordination of women to men."42 As I shall
argue below, it is difficult to say with any confidence what sorts
of conduct or practices violate this vague standard.43 But it is
clear that at least many instances of deliberate discrimination
against men would pass MacKinnon's test. For this reason, it
fails to treat individuals with the equal consideration and
respect they deserve.
MacKinnon's dominance approach is also inconsistent with
liberalism's commitment to neutrality with respect to contested
conceptions of the good.4 4 MacKinnon's approach assumes
that equality is the dominant, lexically prior political value.
Thus, the fact that anti-pornography laws might result in the
suppression of works of serious artistic or literary merit is
shrugged off by MacKinnon with the remark, "[I]f a woman is
subjected, why should it matter that the work has other
value?"45 Similarly, the fact that sweeping judicially-ordered
comparable worth reforms might have serious repercussions
for the nation's economic health is not seen as a good reason
why courts should refrain from treating market-driven pay
inequities as actionable forms of sex discrimination. 46 By con-
trast, current sex discrimination law does not view equality as a
sovereign good that invariably trumps such competing values
as individual liberty, individual rights, or the common good. It
recognizes that there may be "important governmental objec-
tives ' 47 that on occasion override the state's interest in pro-
moting gender equality. Strikingly, MacKinnon offers no
argument why equality should be viewed as the supreme polit-
ical virtue, or why judges should treat it as such in interpreting
41. See Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-30
(1987); TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1569.
42. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 17, at 248.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 48-61.
44. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99
ETHICs 883, 883-84 (1989); CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL
COMPLEXITY 44-47 (1987); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 191-92. For a feminist
critique of this conception of liberalism, see Robin L. West, Liberalism
Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PIr. L. REV. 673
(1985).
45. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 152-53.
46. See id. at 36.
47. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 n.7 (1976).
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and applying statutory and constitutional prohibitions against
gender discrimination. Yet such an argument is clearly needed,
since there is little evidence that the nation now views, or has
ever viewed, equality as a sovereign and overriding social and
political value.
Finally, MacKinnon's dominance approach conflicts with
liberal jurisprudence's commitment to the ideal of the rule of
law.48 That ideal requires, among other things,49 that govern-
ment give fair warning to "the world in language that the com-
mon world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed."5 The dominance approach runs afoul
of this ideal by employing a test of actionable gender discrimi-
nation that is so vague that it provides no meaningful guidance
to citizens and transforms judges into "knight-errant[s], roam-
ing at will in pursuit of. . .[their] own ideal of beauty or of
goodness."'"
MacKinnon argues that judges should regard any social
relations or practices that "participate in the subordination of
women to men"5 2 as unlawful forms of sex discrimination. But
of course there are wide disagreements, not least among femi-
nist groups, about what sorts of practices do contribute to the
subordination of women. Does "special" treatment for preg-
nant women and working mothers do more to advance or to set
back the cause of women's equality?53 Do affirmative action
quotas for women contribute to greater equality between the
sexes or do they serve rather to reinforce gender stereotypes
and provoke resentment from more qualified males who are
passed over for hiring and promotion?54 Does the legal
enforcement of surrogate mother contracts serve to
"subordinate" women to men?55 Do all-female schools and
associations help to empower women by providing "support,
48. See ALTMAN, supra note 5, at 23-27.
49. For discussions of the concept of the rule of law, see LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210-29 (1979); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971).
50. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); see also Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
51. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141
(1921).
52. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 17, at 248.
53. For constrasting positions, see sources cited in Bartlett, supra note
4, at 842 n.48, and Rhode, supra note 8, at 623 n.22.
54. For a helpful overview, see RHODE, supra note 4, at 184-90.
55. For a full discussion of the relevant issues, see MARTHA FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1991).
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solidarity, and self-esteem" 56 for a subordinate group, or do
they harm women by perpetuating disempowering gender ste-
reotypes? 57 Do reproductive technologies and liberal abortion
laws that permit couples to select the sex of their child respect
or violate women's right not to be subordinated to men?5" Do
laws denying the right of homosexual couples to marry "par-
ticipate" in men's subjugation of women?59 These are but a
few of the difficult and controversial questions that must be
asked and answered by unelected judges under MacKinnon's
dominance test of actionable sex discrimination. That test is so
open-ended, and the source of judges' authority to apply it is
so obscure, that it is impossible to reconcile it with the ideal of
the rule of law.
MacKinnon, it seems, would be untroubled by this conclu-
sion. She speaks slightingly of such examples of "male
supremacist jurisprudence" as "standards for scope of judicial
review, norms of judicial restraint, reliance on precedent, sepa-
ration of powers, and the division between public and private
law." 6 ° From a woman's perspective, she asserts, "the rule of
law and the rule of men are one thing."' 6' But to pursue lasting
gender equality by abandoning the ideal of the rule of law is
not only dangerous-for the rule of law is a hard-won and
essential protection for both men and women against arbitrary
and oppressive state action-but is also likely to prove self-
defeating. For once the ideal of the rule of law has been aban-
doned, there can be no security that the gains women have
achieved will be preserved.
None of this, of course, is to suggest that liberals cannot
support far-reaching legislative action to promote greater gen-
der equality in the workplace, in education, and in other areas
of public life. Indeed, liberalism's commitment to autonomy
and equal opportunity may require liberals to support such
egalitarian initiatives as government-mandated maternity and
parental leave, day care, flex-time, shorter work weeks, and
affirmative action. But liberals must reject, and are right to
56. RHODE, supra note 4, at 298.
57. See generally id. at 288-99.
58. See generally TEST-TUBE WOMEN (Rita Arditti et al. eds., 1984); SEX
SELECTION OF CHILDREN (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983).
59. See generally Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same
Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134 (1988); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187.
60. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 17, at 238.
61. Id. at 170.
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reject, attempts such as MacKinnon's to pursue the goal of gen-
der equality by radically redefining the concept of gender
discrimination.
II. WOMEN'S MORALITY AND THE LAW
A central theme in some strands of recent feminist thought
has been that women reason "in a different voice" morally, a
voice that has long been wrongly ignored or downplayed in
"male-stream" moral, political, and legal theory.62 In this sec-
tion, I shall consider this claim primarily as it relates to legal
theory and doctrine.
Much of the recent interest in a distinctively feminine ethic
can be traced to the pathbreaking work of Harvard develop-
mental psychologist Carol Gilligan.6" Gilligan's studies of
women's moral development found that men and women often
approach moral problems in markedly different ways. Women,
she concluded, "tend to value relationships and connections-
an 'ethic of care'-whereas men tend to place a higher pre-
mium on abstraction, rights, autonomy, separation, formality,
and neutrality-an 'ethic of justice.' "' Modem theories of
morality and moral development have generally either ignored
this "different voice" or treated it as inferior to an ethic ofjus-
tice. But an ethic of justice, Gilligan argued, is importantly
incomplete unless it is supplemented by an ethic of care.65
How exactly does an ethic of care differ from an ethic of
justice? According to Joan Tronto, the main differences can be
grouped under the following three heads:
1. moral capacities: learning moral principles (justice)
versus developing moral dispositions (care);
2. moral reasoning: solving problems by seeking princi-
ples that have universal applicability (justice) versus
seeking responses that are appropriate to the particu-
lar case (care);
62. For a representative sampling of the (by now) voluminous
literature, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Annette C.
Baier, What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?, 19 Nous 53 (1985);
Symposium, In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS 304 (1986);
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva F. Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).
63. See GILLIGAN, supra note 62; see also Carol Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNS
324 (1986); Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN
AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 19.
64. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 827-28.
65. See GILLIGAN, supra note 62, at 100.
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3. moral concepts: attending to rights and fairness (jus-
tice) versus attending to responsibilities and relation-
ships (care).6 6
As Tronto's summary makes clear, a feminist ethic of care
shares much in common with a number of more familiar moral
theories, including contemporary virtue ethics, 6 7 communitari-
anism, 6 8 pragmatist ethics, 6' and Christian agapism. 70  It
should thus be seen as part of a broader movement that is criti-
cal of what is seen as contemporary liberalism's excessive
emphasis on such values as objectivity, impartiality, universal-
ity, abstractness, rule-based decision-making, individualism,
and autonomy.
Although it is still too early to make any firm predictions
about the long-term success or failure of the feminist critique
of liberal normative theory, there can be little doubt that the
critique is important and merits very careful consideration.
Four aspects of that critique strike me as particularly sugges-
tive. First, I think it must be admitted, as feminist critics have
charged, that liberal theorists ofjustice have unduly "neglected
the development of the affective capacities underlying our
66. KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 265 (paraphrasing Joan C. Tronto,
Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 648 (1987)).
67. See generally PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS
IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1978); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY
IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy,
33 PHIL. 1 (1958); JAMES D. WALLACE, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); N.J.H.
DENT, THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VIRTUES (1984); VIRTUES:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER (Robert B. Krutschwitz &
Robert C. Roberts eds., 1987); 13 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: ETHICAL
THEORY: CHARACTER AND VIRTUE (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988)
[hereinafter CHARACTER AND VIRTUE]; RICHARD TAYLOR, VIRTUE ETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION (1991).
68. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). See generally Amy
Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 308
(1985).
69. See, e.g.,JOHN DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION (1939); C.I. LEWIS, AN
ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND VALUATION (1946); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1966 (1990); Bartlett, supra note
4, at 849-63.
70. See, e.g., ANDERS NYGREN, EROS AND AGAPE (1932); PAUL RAMSEY,
BASIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS 92-132 (1950); M.C. D'ARcY, THE MIND AND HEART
OF LOVE (1959); William K. Frankena, Love and Principle in Christian Ethics, in
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 203 (Alvin Plantinga ed., 1964); GENE OUTKA, AGAPE:
AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1972); cf. NODDINGS, supra note 62, at 99-100.
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sense of justice."'" Recent theorists of justice have concen-
trated heavily on the question, Which abstract principles ofjus-
tice are best? and have largely ignored the equally important
question, How will individuals best be equipped to act mor-
ally?7" By so doing, such theorists have overlooked or given
short shrift to the morally crucial fact that "people will only
develop an effective 'sense of justice' if they learn a broad
range of moral capacities, including the capacity for sympa-
thetic and imaginative perception of the particular situation. 
7 s
Second, feminist critics have argued forcefully that justice theo-
rists have understated the extent to which morality "consists in
attention to, understanding of, and emotional responsiveness
toward the individuals with whom one stands"74 in a web of
ongoing relationships. The quality of our everyday moral lives
depends heavily on the quality of our daily and hourly interac-
tions with co-workers, family members, and other particular
others with whom we stand in such ongoing relationships. Yet
justice theorists, with their emphasis on individual rights,
impartiality, and universality, have largely neglected this
important realm of particular others in everyday moral life.
Third, and relatedly, justice theorists can be faulted for having
devoted painstaking attention to such justice concepts as
"ought," "right," and "obligation," while virtually ignoring
such important virtue concepts as "care," "compassion," and
"empathy." 75 Finally, feminist ethicians of care have argued
cogently that recent theorists of justice have at times been
guilty of the vices of excessive abstraction, formalistic rigidity,
and insensitivity to context.76
Critics, however, have voiced a number of important con-
cerns about a distinctively feminine ethic of care. Some have
71. KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 266.
72. See Tronto, supra note 66, at 657 n.46.
73. KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 266.
74. Lawrence Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,
98 ETHICS 472, 473 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Baier, supra note 62, at 56-57; FOOT, supra note 67, at 1-18;
cf David Solomon, Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics, in CHARACTER AND
VIRTUE, supra note 67, at 428; SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY (1990) (arguing that liberal theorists have devoted insufficient
attention to the justice or injustice of the gendered family).
76. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 4, at 316-17; Virginia Held, Feminism and
Moral Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 111, 116-18;
Bartlett, supra note 4, at 849-63; Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman,
Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 53 (1988); Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 395-96 (1984);
cf Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 431-440
(1990) (discussing similar charges made by contemporary legal pragmatists).
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questioned whether Gilligan's "different voice" in fact exists
or, if it does, whether this voice is exclusively or even predomi-
nantly female.77 Others have argued that it is strategically dan-
gerous to promote a feminine ethic of care, since this may
reinforce longstanding stereotypes about women's place being
"in the home."7" Still others have charged that the notion of
"caring" is too vague to provide determinate guidance in con-
crete cases; 79 that it is difficult or impossible for an ethic of care
to provide an adequate account of ethical relationships
between strangers; 0 that moral principles are needed to avoid
capricious decision-making and to order our priorities when we
confront conflicting opportunities or responsibilities for car-
ing; and that the emphasis ethicians of care place on preserv-
ing relationships and providing care risks valorizing
relationships in which women are seriously abused or
exploited. 2
These are serious criticisms and concerns, and it remains
to be seen whether ethicians of care can successfully respond to
them. Here I would like to consider a related issue: namely the
extent to which an ethic of care can be extended from the realm
of morality to the realm of law. I shall argue that such an
extension is more problematic than many care theorists have
assumed.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish two quite differ-
ent claims about the role an ethic of care ought to play in the
law. The first and more common claim is that the prevailing
ethic ofjustice in law needs to be supplemented by an ethic of
care. 8  On this view, the basic principles of liberal jurispru-
77. See, e.g., John M. Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A
Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. RES.
597 (1983); Tronto, supra note 66, at 646-52.
78. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MiCH. L. REV.
797 (1989); FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 38-39; Tronto, supra
note 66, at 652-56.
79. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 280-82; Held, supra note 76, at
118-20.
80. See, e.g., George Sher, Other Voices, Other Rooms? Women's Psychology
and Moral Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 178, 183;
Claudia Card, Caring and Evil, 5 HYPATIA 101, 102 (1990).
81. See, e.g., Held, supra note 76, at 118-20; JEAN GRIMSHAW,
PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING 219 (1986); Joan M. Shaughnessy,
Gilligan's Travels, 7J.L. & INEQUALITY 1, 26 (1988); KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at
267-69; Sher, supra note 80, at 180-81.
82. See, e.g., Card, supra note 80, at 106; Barbara Houston, Caring and
Exploitation, 5 HYPATIA 115, 116-17 (1990).
83. See, e.g., Michael Stocker, Duty and Friendship: Toward a Synthesis of
Gilligan's Contrastive Positions, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 62, at
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dence are essentially sound but those principles need to be
augmented (and thus qualified) by principles that emphasize
the "feminine" values of caring, responsibility, and personal
connectedness. The second and less common claim is that the
ethic ofjustice should be largely or wholly replaced by an ethic
of care. 4 It is this second, more radical claim that I wish to
consider here.
The fundamental problem with this more radical ethic of
care is that rule-based decision-making is far more central to
law than it is to morality. Thus, although in ethics there are
powerful traditions which hold that rules ought to play a rela-
tively minor role in moral theory and deliberation,8 5 there are
no similar traditions in law.86 On the contrary, legal theorists
from Aquinas87 to Finnis88 and from Austin 89 to Hart 9° have
56, 67; Lawrence Kohlberg, 2 ESSAYS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT 340 (1984);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 48 (1985); Kenneth Karst,
Women's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 471; GILLIGAN, supra note 62, at 33;
Diana T. Meyers, The Socialized Individual and Individual Autonomy: An
Intersection Between Philosophy and Psychology, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
THEORY 231 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983).
84. See, e.g., NODDINGS, supra note 62; Tronto, supra note 66, at 657-58
n.46; Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
L.J. 1373, 1385-86 (1986); Sara Ruddick, Preservative Love and Military
Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace, in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY, supra note 62, at 139; Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576-77 (1988).
85. See generally Solomon, supra note 75 (discussing virtue ethics);
OUTKA, supra note 70, at 94-122 (discussing various forms of situation ethics);
JJ.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 42-57 (defending a
version of act-utilitarianism that regards moral rules as mere rules of thumb).
86. The closest analogues are perhaps certain extreme forms of "rule
skepticism," characteristic of some strands of American Legal Realism, which
denied that there are any authoritative legal rules at all. See, e.g., JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 257 (1930). Such theories are now
widely seen to have rested on confusions. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 132-37 (1961); THEODORE M. BENDITr, LAW AS RULE AND
PRINCIPLE 1-42 (1978); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 161-66 (1982).
87. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, q. 90, a. 4
(Anton C. Pegis ed., 1945) (c.1270) (defining "law" as "an ordinance of
reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the
community").
88. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 276 (1980)
(defining "law," in part, as "rules made, in accordance with regulative legal
rules, by a determinate legal authority... for a 'complete' community, and
buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of
adjudicative institutions").
89. SeeJOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 10
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been united in seeing law as an essentially rule-governed
activity.
Because law essentially is, in Lon Fuller's famous phrase,
"the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules,"' there are significant limits on the extent to which an
ethic of care can be incorporated into legal theory and practice.
As Frederick Schauer notes in a major recent study of the sub-
ject,92 rule-based decision-making fosters a number of impor-
tant legal values. It promotes the values of stability and
predictability by enabling individuals to rely on past decisions
and to make choices and commit resources based on those
expectations. It furthers the values of liberty and rightful
authority by limiting the allocation of power to those we think
should exercise power.9" And it promotes the value of effi-
ciency by discouraging the continual relitigation of legal issues
and freeing judges and other legal decision-makers from the
necessity of continually rethinking such issues de novo.95
These values would be seriously undermined by a jurispru-
dence that strongly privileges responsibilities over rights, rela-
tionships over fairness, and context-specific judgment over
rule-based decision-making.
This is not, of course, to suggest that an ethic of care has
no part to play in an effective and morally defensible legal
order. The central insight of an ethic of care-that moral and
legal reasoning which "operates at the level of abstract princi-
ples risks neglecting the actual people and pain involved in a
particular problem" 96-has been unduly neglected in main-
stream liberal jurisprudence. My point is simply that the natu-
ral home of an ethic of care lies in the realm of morality rather
than in law, and that there are substantial difficulties in
(Noonday Press 1954) (1832) (defining "law" as "a rule laid down for the
guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over
him").
90. See HART, supra note 86, at 77-96 (arguing that a legal system is a
union of obligation-imposing ("primary") and power-conferring
("secondary") rules).
91. FULLER, supra note 49, at 74.
92. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991).
93. See id. at 137-38, 157; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF
THE COMMON LAW 16 (1988).
94. See SCHAUER, supra note 92, at 159; see also Michael S. Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 314-15 (1985).
95. See SCHAUER, supra note 92, at 145.
96. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1597, 1628 (1990) (attributing this view to Carol Gilligan).
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extending such an ethic from the one realm to the other. In the
realm of morality, a strong case can be made that there is a
sphere of vital importance-that of the "particular other"-
that is poorly captured by such justice-based notions as impar-
tiality, universality, autonomy, and individual rights. In law,
however, the sphere of the particular other is necessarily much
more circumscribed, for two related reasons. First, law is prop-
erly directed at the common good rather than at the merely
private good of individuals or of individual rulers."7 For this
reason, judges and other legal decision-makers have an institu-
tional duty to be fair and impartial in their official dealings,
even to those to whom they are connected in networks of care.
Second, as we saw earlier, law, unlike morality, is an intrinsi-
cally and pervasively rule-governed activity. As a result, the
kinds of highly contextual, situation-specific modes of reason-
ing that may be suitable in many moral contexts will generally
be out of place in the law, where, in Justice Brandeis' oft-
quoted phrase, it is often "more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."9
In short, the argument advanced by some feminist legal
theorists that the prevailing ethic of justice in American juris-
prudence should be abandoned in favor of a feminist ethic of
care cannot be sustained. An ethic of care may, to some extent,
be a useful and needed supplement or corrective to standard
justice-based approaches to legal doctrine and scholarship.
But to go beyond this and insist that an ethic of care should
largely or wholly supplant these standard approaches would be
to abandon deeply rooted ideals that are fundamental to any
legal regime premised on the rule of law.
III. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF PORNOGRAPHY
We turn finally to one of the most widely discussed and
controversial strands in recent feminist legal thought: the fem-
inist critique of pornography. That critique takes a number of
different forms, not all of which are clearly inconsistent with
the basic principles of liberal jurisprudence. Here I shall be
concerned with the explicitly anti-liberal feminist claim, argued
most forcefully by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
that pornography is a form of sex discrimination against
97. See generally FINNIS, supra note 88, at 154-56; JACQUES MARITAIN,
MAN AND THE STATE 12-27 (1951).
98. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1992]
312 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
women that should be prohibited regardless of any literary or
other social value it may possess.
Until recently, as Joel Feinberg notes, "the demand for
legal restraints on pornography came mainly from 'sexual con-
servatives,' those who regarded the pursuit of erotic pleasure
for its own sake to be immoral or degrading, and its public
depiction obscene."99 Beginning in the 1970s, however, these
conservatives were joined by an unlikely ally: liberal and radi-
cal feminists who had been in the forefront of the sexual
revolution.' 0 0 According to these new critics, pornography
should be regulated or prohibited, not because explicit depic-
tions of erotic pleasure are inherently sinful or corrupting, but
because pornography harms women in at least three well-docu-
mented ways.
First, there is a large and growing body of evidence that
women are often harmed in the production of pornography.' 0 '
"[I]n many cases, women, mostly very young and often the vic-
tims of sexual abuse as children, are forced into pornography
and brutally mistreated thereafter. The participants have been
beaten, forced to commit sex acts, imprisoned, bound and
gagged, and tortured."'0 2 Abuses appear widespread in the $8
billion a year, mob-controlled pornography industry.'0°
Second, there is "highly suggestive" 104 evidence that at
least one kind of pornography-that which depicts sexual vio-
lence against women-is causally linked to higher rates of rape
99. JOEL FEINBERG, 2 THE MORAL LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 143
(1985).
100. For early feminist critiques of pornography, see SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 393-94 (1975);
Robin Morgan, Pornography and Rape.- Theory and Practice, in GOING Too FAR
165 (Robin Morgan ed., 1977); Symposium, Degradation of Women Versus Right
of Free Speech, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 181 (1978-79); TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer ed., 1980); ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
101. For helpful background material, see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 767-86, 856-
69 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. See also FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 17, at 179-83.
102. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 589, 595.
103. The figure estimates are from FRANKLIN M. OSANKA & SARAH LEE
JOHANN, SOURCEBOOK ON PORNOGRAPHY 3 (1989). The link between
pornography and organized crime is extensively explored in FINAL REPORT,
supra note 101, at 1037-238.
104. Sunstein, supra note 102, at 598.
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and other forms of sexual aggression directed against
women.' 0 5 As Cass Sunstein notes:
Some laboratory studies show a reduced sensitivity
to sexual violence on the part of men who have been
exposed to pornography. Men questioned after such
exposure seem more prepared to accept rape and other
forms of violence against women, to believe that women
derive pleasure from violence, to associate sex with vio-
lence; they also report a greater likelihood of committing
rape themselves. And after being exposed to violent por-
nography, some men report having aggressive sexual fan-
tasies .... In light of the relevant findings, it is highly
plausible to believe that the general climate reinforced by
pornography contributes to an increased level of sexual
violence against women.1
0 6
Finally, feminist critics contend that pornography harms
women by reinforcing sexist attitudes and stereotypes that lead
to unlawful sex discrimination and foster gender inequality.10 7
In pornography, Susan Brownmiller charges, women and their
bodies are "stripped, exposed, and contorted for the purpose
of ridicule to bolster that 'masculine esteem' which gets its kick
and sense of power from viewing females as anonymous, pant-
ing playthings, adult toys, dehumanized objects to be used,
abused, broken and discarded."'0 8  In this way, she says,
"[p]ornography is the undiluted essence of anti-female
propoganda."
0 9
Because of the various harms to women that result from
pornographic speech, many feminists have argued that pornog-
raphy is and should be a legally actionable form of sex discrimi-
nation-a violation of women's civil rights." 0  A model
ordinance to this effect, drafted by Catharine MacKinnon and
105. See, e.g., EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF
PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1987);
PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION (Neil Malamuth & Edward
Donnerstein eds., 1984); FINAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 773-80. See
generally OSANKA & JOHANN, supra note 103, at 130-252. For a discussion of
some of the methodological difficulties in establishing such a causal link, see
DONALD A. DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 169-72 (1989).
106. Sunstein, supra note 102, at 598.
107. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 169-95.
108. BROWNMILLER, supra note 100, at 393-94.
109. Id. at 394.
110. See, e.g., FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 17, at 163-213; Finley,
supra note 36, at 364-74. Not all feminists, of course, support such efforts.
See, e.g., WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985) (collecting
essays opposing this and other attempts to censor pornography).
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Andrea Dworkin, was first proposed in Minneapolis in 1983
and adopted the following year in Indianapolis."' In the form
enacted in Indianapolis, the ordinance prohibited four prac-
tices it labeled discriminatory: (a) "trafficking" in pornogra-
phy, 1 2 (b) "forcing" pornography on a person in any place of
employment, school, home, or public place," 3 (c) "coercing,
intimidating, or fraudulently inducing" a person into perform-
ing or appearing in a pornographic production or work,"' and
(d) assaulting or injuring a person "in a way that is directly
caused by specific pornography.""' 5 The ordinance defined
"pornography" for purposes of the enactment as "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures
or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy
pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experi-
ence sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut
up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as
dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed
into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects
or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation,
injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes
these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domina-
tion, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or
use, or through postures or positions of servility or
display." ' ' 6
In 1985, Indianapolis' antipornography ordinance was
struck down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Amen'-
111. For a detailed discussion of the events surrounding the anti-
pornography movements in Minneapolis and Indianapolis, see DowNs, supra
note 105, at 34-143.
112. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th
Cir. 1985). The ordinance defined "trafficking" as the "production, sale,
exhibition, or distribution of pornography."
113. Id. at 325-26.
114. Id. at 325.
115. Id. at 326.
116. Id. at 324. Materials judged to be pornographic only in virtue of
part (6) of this definition were exempted from the trafficking provision.
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can Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, ' a decision summarily
affirmed the following year by the Supreme Court." 8 I shall
argue that these cases were correctly decided, since the ordi-
nance in question (a) was excessively vague, (b) was constitu-
tionally overbroad, and (c) constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination by the state.
Courts have long held that a law is void on its face if it is so
vague that persons of "common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." ' 19 Such
laws offend the due process requirement of fair notice, 20 open
the door to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,' 2' and,
in cases of restrictions on expression, often have an unaccept-
able "chilling" effect on protected speech as potential violators
practice self-censorship rather than risk prosecution or iabil-
ity.' 2 2 By failing to define such key terms as "sexually explicit,"
"subordination," "sexual object," and "degradation," none of
which have a clear meaning or application in ordinary usage,
the Indianapolis ordinance violates all three of these measures
of impermissible vagueness.
23
The ordinance is also overbroad since it sweeps within its
ambit works that have serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value. 124 By failing to exempt works of significant social
value, the ordinance runs afoul of the well-established first
amendment principle that laws that directly target "high value"
speech are prohibited unless they are narrowly tailored to
achieve some exceptionally compelling governmental
interest. '
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Finally, by discriminating on its face between approved
and disapproved ways of depicting women, the ordinance vio-
lates one of the "fixed star[s] in our constitutional constella-
tion:" the principle "that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." '26 As Judge Easterbrook notes
in his majority opinion in Hudnut:
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is
"pornography" or not depending on the perspective the
author adopts. Speech that "subordinates" women and
also, for example, presents women as enjoying pain,
humiliation, or rape, or even simply presents women in
"positions of servility or submission or display" is forbid-
den, no matter how great the literary or political value of
the work taken as a whole. Speech that portrays women
in positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic
the sexual content. This is thought control. It estab-
lishes an "approved" view of women, of how they may
react to sexual encounters, of how the sexes may relate to
each other. Those who espouse the approved view may
use sexual images; those who do not, may not. 127
In an impassioned response to the Hudnut decision, Catha-
rine MacKinnon argues that this reading of the ordinance
elides the crucial fact that the law was directed at harm rather
than viewpoint. 28 Its purpose, she claims, was to prevent sex-
ual violence and other concrete harms to women, not to sup-
press expression of a particular point of view. This response,
however, rests on a confusion about what it means for a restric-
tion on speech to be "viewpoint-based." As Laurence Tribe
notes, "[afll viewpoint-based regulations are targeted at some
supposed harm, whether it be linked to an unsettling ideology
like Communism or Nazism or to socially shunned practices
like adultery."' 29 What distinguishes viewpoint-based restric-
tions is that they are expressly or deliberately aimed at either
excluding some perspective or point of view from the "market-
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place of ideas,"'13 0 or restricting the expression of one point of
view while favoring or endorsing another.'' The fact that the
Indianapolis ordinance, like any other viewpoint-based regula-
tion, was ultimately aimed at the prevention of harm, cannot
obscure the fact that it also discriminated on its face between
"approved" and "disapproved" ways of portraying women and
relations between the sexes.
An alternative response to Easterbrook's argument would
be to concede that the ordinance in question was viewpoint-
based, but to deny that this should have been regarded as fatal.
As Cass Sunstein points out, the special hostility with which
courts have traditionally viewed viewpoint restrictions is largely
due to two perceived dangers: (a) the evil of "factional tyr-
anny" (where government power is usurped by one or more
private groups), and (b) the evil of "self-interested representa-
tion" (where rulers "seek to insulate themselves and to pro-
mote their interests at the expense of the ruled")." 2 Neither of
these evils is seriously threatened by restrictions on violent or
degrading pornography. So given that the value of such por-
nography is almost universally conceded to be low, and that
such materials do (as Judge Easterbrook expressly concedes)1
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cause all of the various harms feminists claim, why shouldn't
courts apply a less stringent standard of review to such restric-
tions and, in fact, sustain them?
The answer, as Geoffrey Stone explains, is that
government
cannot suppress graphic sexually explicit expression
because it portrays women as sexual objects who enjoy
humiliation and rape without opening the door to other
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forms of viewpoint-based suppression. If viewpoint-
based restrictions are permissible in this context, there is
no principled basis for distinguishing other speech that
may also be harmful.' 34
The fact is that many sorts of protected speech cause demon-
strable harm. This is certainly true, as Judge Easterbrook
emphasizes, 3 5 of the political speech of Klansmen, Nazis, and
other like-minded purveyors of hatred and intolerance. But it
is also clearly true of many forms of non-political speech that
impinge more directly on the cause of women's equality. For
despite feminist claims that pornography is "[c]entral to the
institutionalization of male dominance,"' 36 there can be little
doubt that pornography causes much less harm to women than
do many far more pervasive media images of violence,137 mach-
ismo,138 and gender inequality.' 39 To permit viewpoint-based
restrictions on pornography would thus open the door to simi-
lar restrictions across a vast swatch of currently protected
expression. As Stone argues, 140 this is a door that is best left
closed.
Having said this much, it is important to note that not all
forms of antipornography legislation are necessarily inconsis-
tent with conventional legal doctrine and liberal jurisprudence.
Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued forcefully that a nar-
rowly drawn, harm-based regulation aimed specifically at low-
value violent pornography can be justified on conventional
legal grounds. 141 Such a regulation would avoid the problems
of vagueness and overbreadth that proved fatal to the Indian-
apolis antipornography ordidinance. By targeting only those
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sexually explicit materials that eroticize violence against
women, it would extend only to those materials linked most
clearly and directly to concrete harms against women. And by
focusing explicitly on harm rather than viewpoint, it would
avoid the peculiarly troubling concerns associated with view-
point-based regulations.
In sum, none of the three radical feminist critiques
examined in this paper is successful. This is not to say, how-
ever, that they are wholly groundless. On the contrary, each of
them can usefully be seen as indefensible extensions of more
moderate feminist critiques that are both sound and important.
Our legal system has done much too little to foster true gender
equality; it has placed undue emphasis on abstract rights and
rules; and it has too long ignored the concrete and substantial
harms that hard-core pornographic materials may cause. None
of these more moderate critiques goes to the heart of liberal
jurisprudence. None, that is, tends to show that the core prin-
ciples of liberal legal thought are insupportable. But they do
challenge liberals to re-examine the implications of those prin-
ciples and to rethink many traditional assumptions about gen-
der and the law that have long served to harm and
disadvantage women.
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